The Suspension of History in Contemporary Media Arts by Ross, Christine
Érudit est un consortium interuniversitaire sans but lucratif composé de l'Université de Montréal, l'Université Laval et l'Université du Québec à
Montréal. Il a pour mission la promotion et la valorisation de la recherche. Érudit offre des services d'édition numérique de documents
scientifiques depuis 1998.
Pour communiquer avec les responsables d'Érudit : info@erudit.org 
Article
 
"The Suspension of History in Contemporary Media Arts"
 
Christine Ross
Intermédialités : histoire et théorie des arts, des lettres et des techniques / Intermediality:
           History and Theory of the Arts, Literature and Technologies, n° 11, 2008, p. 125-148.
 
 
 
Pour citer cet article, utiliser l'information suivante :
 
URI: http://id.erudit.org/iderudit/037541ar
Note : les règles d'écriture des références bibliographiques peuvent varier selon les différents domaines du savoir.
Ce document est protégé par la loi sur le droit d'auteur. L'utilisation des services d'Érudit (y compris la reproduction) est assujettie à sa politique
d'utilisation que vous pouvez consulter à l'URI https://apropos.erudit.org/fr/usagers/politique-dutilisation/
Document téléchargé le 12 février 2017 02:39
125
in t er médi a lit és • no 11 pr in t emps 2 0 0 8
The Suspension of History in  
Contemporary Media Arts
ChrisT ine ross
S ince Lessing’s Laocoön (1766) the question of time in visual arts has been presented as a problem to be overcome1 through a variety of aesthetic 
 strategies that both sustain and sidestep painting’s and sculpture’s material limi-
tations that allegedly conﬁne them, in contrast to poetry, to the representation of 
a “single moment of time” and “single vantage point.”2 Following this aesthetics, 
art can only but suggest (and not represent) the temporal deployment of bodies in 
space, notably by selecting the moment in a given narrative most likely to confer 
“free reign” to the spectator’s imagination. Challenging this enduring rule and 
attempting to widen the restrictive register of the momentary, contemporary art 
has positioned itself as a pivotal site of temporal experimentation.  Refuting the 
Lessing-inspired “presentness” of formalist modernism—the timeless i mmersion 
in formal composition defended by Michael Fried in his infamous article “Art 
and Objecthood” (1967) which denounced the phenomenological deployment 
of endless duration in the experience of the artwork—contemporary  aesthetics 
has generated pictorial and photographic as well as time-based  practices 
( performance, installation, video and new media) that inscribe the spectator in 
different experiences of duration: the ephemerality and theatricality of the  artwork 
(two predominant traits of contemporary art), the slowing down,  condensation 
or  acceleration of the media image that extends, abbreviates or speeds up the 
 perceptual experience of the artwork, the rejection of linear  progression, of all 
resolution in ﬁne. It has also questioned, narratively and formally, the conventions 
1. Sections of this paragraph were initially co-written by Johanne Lamoureux and 
myself for the presentation of Dyschronie de l’image, a colloquium organized in the con-
text of the ACFAS annual congress in May 2006.
2. Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, Laocoön: An Essay on the Limits of Painting and Poetry 
[1766], trans. Edward Allen McCormick, Indianapolis and New York, The Bobbs-Merrill 
Company, 1962, p. 19.
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of historical time of classical modernity—the subordination of time to space and 
movement, time as equal flow, the permanence of the monument, together with 
the notion of history as progress, project, and telos. In the ﬁelds of art history 
and aesthetics, a whole repertoire of concepts sustain the historical and philo-
sophical reflection of this critique: the time-image of Nouvelle Vague cinema 
(Deleuze), the anti-monument (Huyssen), warped space (Vidler), post- memory 
(Sturken), time in ruins (Augé), chronophobia (Lee), anachronism as “an 
 opening of  history” (Didi-Huberman), anachrony as a mean to deﬁne new tem-
poral  switchings (Rancière), the return of the baroque (Bal), the archaeological 
impulse (Foster), the affective body as what enframes digital information and 
allows for the generation of time-consciousness (Hansen), the u-chronic time of 
digital ﬁguration (Couchot), heterochrony (Bourriaud),3 and contemporaneity 
as what discloses “the multiple ways of being with, in, and out of time, […] with 
others and without them”.4
Many of these concepts have been proposed to disclose contemporary art’s 
increased attention to the historical narrative, namely to methods of archaeology 
and archival research as well as the role of memory, oblivion, utopia, progress, 
difference and ﬁction in the construction of the récit historique. But in the midst 
of these temporal experimentations and most signiﬁcantly since the 1980s, media 
arts have set into play a unique, ampliﬁed, preoccupation with the  passage of 
3. Gilles Deleuze, L’image-temps, Paris, Les Éditions de Minuit, coll. “Critique”, 1985; 
Andreas Huyssen, Twilight Memories: Marking Time in a Culture of Amnesia,  London 
and New York, Routledge, 1995 and Present Pasts: Urban Palimpsests and the Politics of 
Memory, Stanford, Stanford University Press, coll. “Cultural Memory in the Present”, 
2003; Marita Sturken, “Imaging Postmemory/Renegotiating History,” Afterimage 26, n° 6, 
May/June 1999, p. 10-12; Anthony Vidler, Warped Space: Art, Architecture, and Anxiety 
in Modern Culture, Cambridge, MIT Press, 2002; Marc Augé, Le temps en ruines, Paris, 
Éditions Galilée, coll. “Collection Lignes ﬁctives”, 2003; Pamela M. Lee, Chronophobia: 
On Time in the Art of the 1960s, Cambridge, MIT Press, 2004; Georges Didi-Huberman, 
Devant le temps: histoire de l’art et anachronisme des images, Paris, Les Éditions de Minuit, 
coll. “Critique”, 2000 and L’image survivante. Histoire de l’art et temps des fantômes selon 
Aby Warburg, Paris, Les Éditions de Minuit, coll. “Paradoxe”, 2002; Jacques Rancière, “Le 
concept d’anachronisme et la vérité de l’historien,” L’inactuel, n° 6, 1996, p. 53-68; Mark 
B.N. Hansen, New Philosophy for New Media, Cambridge, MIT Press, 2004; Edmond 
Couchot, Des images, du temps et des machines dans les arts et la communication, Arles, 
Éditions Jacqueline Chambon/Actes Sud, 2007.
4. Terry Smith, “Creating Dangerously, then and now,” in Okwui Enwezor, (ed.), 
The Unhomely: Phantom Scenes in Global Society, 2nd International Biennial of Contem-
porary Art of Seville, Sevilla: BIACS, 2006, p. 120.
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time, one that has remained largely under-examined despite its crucial impetus 
to bridge physical, philosophical, social and historical concepts of time. The ﬁeld 
involves a range of perceptual strategies through which the temporal  premise of 
classical modernity—what philosopher Yuval Dolev designates as “the  becoming 
present of future events and then their becoming past”—is suspended and 
 problematized in this very suspension.5 At issue in these works are: the malleabil-
ity of time (its acceleration, compression, and extendedness); its level of reality (is 
time a real thing that is all around us, or is it nothing more than a way of speak-
ing about and measuring events?); a tenseless deﬁance to the notion of the flow 
of time; a spatialization of history which propels its verticality into a horizontal 
deployment; the simultaneity of events and vantage points rather than their suc-
cession; the aesthetic requirement to inhabit the present; and the need to attend 
to the unequal allocation of time.6 
These media practices interrupt the passage of time. Yet, their interruption 
cannot be confused with the “interruptive” montage aesthetics of the historical 
avant-garde, the dada, surrealist, constructivist, readymade fragmentation and 
heterogeneous re-association of words, objects, sounds or images to suspend, 
denounce and collapse speciﬁc myths and ideologies. It does not have the inten-
sity of the avant-garde “act” described by Alain Badiou, the aesthetic rupture by 
which the avant-garde seeks to dissociate itself from the past by creating some-
thing radically new, an event that inscribes art in the present.7 On the contrary, 
the past prevails under the forms of archives, memories, or passed perceptions 
although its tensed relation to the present and the future is broken; and intensity 
has slipped into temperance. More importantly, the suspension procedure cannot 
be separated from François Hartog’s historian observation (and he is not alone 
in this observation—let us think of Badiou himself, but also Jean-Luc Nancy, 
Bruno Latour, Fredric Jameson, Mark Hansen, and others), according to which 
the prevailing regime of historicity of our epoch is not the liberating access to the 
present (as was still the case with the avant-garde) but presentism: the withdrawal 
5. Yuval Dolev, Time and Realism: Metaphysical and Antimetaphysical Perspectives, 
Cambridge, MIT Press, 2007, p. viii and 170.
6. On the unequal allocation of time, which motivates the artist, in the words of 
media theorist Siegfried Zielinski, “to appropriate, or reappropriate, the power of disposal 
over the time that life and art need,” see Siegfried Zielinski, Deep Time of the Media: 
 Toward an Archaeology of Hearing and Seeing by Technical Means, Cambridge, MIT 
Press, 2006, p. 29.
7. Alain Badiou, Le siècle, Paris, Éditions du Seuil, coll. “Ordre philosophique”, 
2005.
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into the present, the turning of the present or even more so, immediacy, into an 
absolute value, whose absoluteness now means a signiﬁcant disconnection from 
the past (perceived as lost) and the future (perceived as increasingly uncertain). 
In this prevalent regime, it is in fact the possibility of history which is on the 
threshold of being lost: historical time is suspended. Recent media art partakes 
of this suspension. But its aesthetics is certainly more generative than the regime 
to which it belongs. The temporal suspensions are to be sure a means of thinking 
about time as time for the sake of time. They must be seen as a string of efforts to 
generate alternative forms of temporality through this very suspension: simulta-
neity, extended instants, anachronisms, returns, delays in real time, and lateral-
ized longues durées. These regenerations, and this is what singularizes them, are 
set into play by a series of ‘post-optical’ strategies, which partake of  contemporary 
art’s questioning of the paradigm of opticality (the Wölfflinian view of vision as 
whole and immediate, as a disembodied process that ‘uniﬁes’ what is seen8). It 
is through aesthetic strategies which put into crisis the spectator’s perception—
the unifying, binding function of perception—that media arts can be said to 
address the time-related stakes of our epoch, what philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy 
has  designated as the contemporary suspension of history and time, in which 
temporality does not disappear but is in fact deployed as a form of spacing or 
 presentism; in which spacing itself becomes a temporal operation. Temporal 
 critique is a perceptual critique. 
Media artists involved in the questioning of the passage of time—I am 
 thinking here, notably, of Melik Ohanian, Akram Zaatari, the Atlas Group, Lyne 
Lapointe, Tacita Dean, Craigie Horsﬁeld, Harun Farocki, Candice Breitz, Eve 
Sussman & the Rufus Corporation, Stan Douglas, Bill Viola, Julieta Aranda, 
Angela Bulloch—coalesce (a coalescence which I believe to be fundamental) 
two speciﬁc aesthetic operations: (1) a refutation of or indifference to the  passage 
of time and (2) perceptual limitedness. My claim will be that this combination 
is a dynamic one, for it is through the phenomenology of perceptual limited-
ness—the spectator’s experience of a fallible perception, especially in its binding 
function—that the suspension of time is both experienced and disclosed but 
also potentially unlocked and released to activate a temporal passage outside 
the parameters of progress, teleology and linear succession. The signiﬁcance of 
this coalescence comes from its presentist context. I want to propose here that 
the media work of French artist Melik Ohanian, which evolves around the 
8. Sebastian Zeidler, introduction to Carl Einstein, Critical Dictionary: “‘Nightin-
gale’ The Etchings of Hercules Seghers”, trans. Charles W. Haxthausen, October, n° 107, 
Winter 2004, p. 210.
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 practice of simultaneity, is an original contribution to this line of investiga-
tion. His media installations are key to the understanding of simultaneity as a 
pro ducer of alternative forms of historical narratives, in which futurity plays a 
renewed pivotal role, although in potentia more than in the work per se. This 
essay seeks to examine the relationship between simultaneity, alternative his-
tory, perception, and futurity, by focusing on three speciﬁc installations but also 
by situating these works in the context of current historical and philosophical 
debates on the  passage of time. Occupied by the following two questions—“How 
is temporal passage provisionally disregarded, even denegated, aesthetically?” 
and “Why does this speciﬁc media aesthetics matter?—, it shows that media art’s 
suspension of time is an active appropriation and response to the contemporary 
—presentist—suspension of history. 
Let me start with a very brief description of three recent media works by 
Melik Ohanian. First, Hidden (2005), a 60 min DVD video projection trans-
mitting a static shot of a sunset in an oil ﬁeld: the landscape sequence  contains 
within its digital encoding an invisible image only made visible by the simul-
taneous projection of that very image in another city and whose cryptographed 
conﬁguration is “exposed” in real time by a computer located next to the screen. 
In a 2006 version, the installation co-projected in two galleries, in Paris and 
in Amsterdam, the hidden image of each other’s visible image—an oil ﬁeld 
Fig. 1 : Seven minutes before, 2004.
Melik Ohanian, Seven minutes before, 2004, 7 synchronized video projections, Beta Digital on DVD with 
DTS Sound, 28 speakers and 7 bass boxes, 7 × 21 min. 2800 × 1200 cm. Courtesy of the artist, KRISTALE 
Company, and Galerie Chantal Crousel, Paris.
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in Floresville, Texas and an oil ﬁeld in Baku, Azerbaijan. The simultaneity of 
the two projections marginalized the passage of time to disclose the thickness 
of a single image in one moment in time, which always hides another image 
of and in another spacetime. But it only paradoxically succeeded in doing so 
by making the other image inaccessible and imperceptible. Second, Seven 
 Minutes Before (2004, ﬁg. 1), a 28 meters-long seven-screen DVD video projec-
tion, whose 21 minute orchestration is shown in a continuous loop. Key to the 
overall structure is the quasi-panoramic unfolding of the installation: the screens 
are  horizontally adjacent to each other and show parallel views of a small valley 
in the French Vercors. The series of images were taken simultaneously by seven 
cameras. The camera trajectories were synchronized at the moment of shooting 
and the seven projected series of images—devoid of montage and submitted to 
a negligible number of cuts—were made to correspond to each of these singular 
trajectories. When we speak here of simultaneity, it is important to emphasize 
that it governs both the Digital Beta ﬁlming in the Vercors and the DVD projec-
tion in the gallery. Interestingly, as in Hidden (ﬁg. 2), the installation inscribes 
the viewer in a perceptual impossibility: it is physiologically unfeasible to see the 
seven screens all at once but, again, as one experiences this impossibility, history 
starts to unfold not as a progression but as a lateral display of temporal multipli-
cities in one moment in time, which suggests a contemporaneity of different 
times but one that can never be grasped as a whole. 
Fig. 2 : Melik Ohanian, Hidden,  2005, DVcam on DVD with sound, PC computer and program, 60 min. 
© Florian Kleinefenn. Courtesy of the artist, Galerie Chantal Crousel, Paris, and Yvon Lambert, New York.
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Thirdly September 11, 1973_Santiago, Chile (2007, ﬁg. 3), the main focus of 
this essay, a single-screen video projection which, despite its apparent straight-
forwardness, has the particularity of inserting the spectator between image and 
sound, between the seeing of mute images of Santiago, Chile, in 2007 and the 
hearing of the sound track of The Coup d’Etat (El golpe de estado), part II of 
Patricio Guzmán’s documentary trilogy The Battle of Chile (La batalla de Chile) 
released between 1975 and 1979. In this installation, Ohanian has introduced 
a ﬁlm archive but has also managed to alter it in a signiﬁcant way. The Coup 
d’Etat chronicles, through a mixed montage of Guzmán’s own footage and news 
 footage, the demise of the democratically elected Unidad Popular  government 
of Salvador Allende (1970-73). It covers the period leading to the 1973 Chilean 
military coup, from the unsuccessful military overthrow of Allende’s government 
in June 1973 to Allende’s ﬁnal speech and the aerial bombing of La Moneda, 
the presidential palace, which ﬁnally led to his death. Ohanian’s installation, 
 however, has only kept the sound component of the archive to re- synchronize 
it with video images pertaining to Santiago today, thirty-four years after the 
 military coup, which were shot by Ohanian himself at the exact locations where 
the events ﬁlmed by Guzmán in 1973 took place. In its co-transmission of sounds 
and images extracted from two different sources, the installation reintro duces 
simultaneity as the structuring temporality of the installation and, with it, 
another perceptual impossibility which also partakes of a fragmentary approach 
Fig. 3 : Melik Ohanian, September 11, 1973 _ Santiago, Chile, 2007, HD video on DVD with ambiant 
sound, 90 min. Courtesy of the artist, Galerie Chantal Crousel, Paris, and Yvon Lambert, New York.
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to representation that blocks the unifying principle of opticality: the unattainable 
reconciliation of vision and aurality. It also articulates, at a level which indicates a 
shift in Ohanian’s work, what I would call a temporalization of the spatial dimen-
sion of simultaneity whereas earlier installations pertained to a spatialization of 
time. It is now sounds about the past and images about the present which are 
made to synchronize with uneasiness.
Simultaneity, the simultaneity of events: a temporality, or more precisely a 
temporal relation, that appears simple (which the Oxford English  Dictionary 
briefly deﬁnes as “existing, happening, occurring […] at the same time; coinci-
dent in time”) and yet, one that has historically been at the center of a variety of 
philosophical and physical conceptualizations of time, and one that must be seen 
as a mobilizer for innovative redeployments of the image. Key to  Ohanian’s work 
is Einstein’s 1905 Special Relativity whose main outcome is that all  judgments 
involving time “are always judgments of simultaneous events”9 inasmuch as 
we understand simultaneity to be not an absolute but a frame-dependent rela-
tionship. Two events are simultaneous if they occur at the same time but their 
simultaneity depends on the clock of the observer, which means that for another 
observer, one event may be measured to precede or follow the other. 
In September 11, 1973_Santiago, Chile, the simultaneity of transmission of 
discordant yet place-related sounds and images is compelling in its exploration 
of  relativity,  fractionalization, and temporal suspension. Indeed, although sound 
and image meet materially through synchronization, they obstinately fail to meet 
temporally: they are part of two realities that cannot blend to create the pas-
sage of time—the becoming present of future events and then their becoming 
past. The soundtrack belongs to a world of socialist struggle, a dialectics between 
the people and military power, communism and capitalism. Removed from its 
initial footage, it unfolds as an aural deployment of military technology sounds 
(helicopters, tanks, gunshots, explosions) and a progression of debates, speeches, 
claims, and declarations made by the main protagonists of this troubled period: 
workers,  communist leaders, Allende himself, pro-Allende and anti-Allende 
generals, leaders from the Christian Democracy Party and the National Party, a 
variety of participants involved in strikes, factory sieges, political meetings, and 
9. Albert Einstein, “Zur Elektrodynamik bewegter Körper,” in Annalen der Physik 
(17), 1905, p. 891-921, reprinted in The Collected Papers of Albert Einstein, trans. Anna Beck 
and Peter Havas, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1987, vol. 2, p. 275-306, quoted in 
Max Jammer, Concepts of Simultaneity: From Antiquity to Einstein and Beyond, Balti-
more, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006, p. 94.
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demonstrations, all engaged in the reacting to and thinking of the  revolutionary 
and anti- revolutionary processes, as well as the decision-making required to act 
accordingly to one’s position. In sharp contrast, the visual rendering of San tiago 
today presents us close-up views of everyday passers-by walking in the city, vacant 
public squares, empty cemeteries, monuments and memorials which no one 
seems to be looking at, a completely restored La Moneda devoid of any sign 
of past bombardment, meaningless images of Allende presented as mere by- 
products, all of which are interspersed with images of guards and military ﬁgures 
whose conti nual attendance varies from a harmless military fanfare to the armed 
surveillance of semi-public buildings and places to the forceful police interven-
tion during a workers’ otherwise paciﬁst street demonstration. These intervals are 
not without disclosing the predominant being-there of forces of order in demo-
cratic Chilean everyday life and the impoverishment of public life coming from 
this persistency. September 11, 1973_Santiago, Chile starts with the ﬁrst sounds of 
Guzmán’s The Coup d’Etat—the flying helicopters of the June 29 failed coup—
exceptionally overlapping with both the soundtrack and the images of two young 
boys in today’s Chile singing about their hope for a better future; it ends with 
The Coup d’Etat’s written statement of hope (“History is ours, it’s made by the 
people”) only to be preceded, however, by the unhopeful simultaneous transmis-
sion of the  victory speeches of the generals responsible for the ﬁnal coup and 
the  infamous  stadium today, here empty, restored and cleaned up, where the 
detention,  tortures,  executions and disappearing of prisoners were infamously 
operated.
As pointed out by historian Steve Stern, Chile is a memory box made out 
of dissimilar views of the past, conflicting “emblematic memories” about the 
coup, remembered either as a salvation (as the event that saved the country), an 
unresolved rupture, a process of persecution and awakening, or simply as a box 
that must remain closed.10 These memory struggles, argues Stern, are central 
to the understanding of the Pinochet dictatorship years and Chile’s progressive 
 transition to democracy. By recovering one of the key ﬁlmic archives documen-
ting the military coup, September 11, 1973_Santiago, Chile is not without engaging 
with the act of remembering but I believe that its fundamental concern is else-
where, not in memory per se. Compared to two key recent ﬁlms on contemporary 
Chile to which I will briefly come back further down—Patricio Guzmán’s Chile, 
la Memoria Obstinada, (Obstinate Memory, 1997) and Ken Loach’s contribution 
10. Steve J. Stern, Remembering Pinochet’s Chile: On the Eve of London 1998, 
 Durham, Duke University Press, 2004.
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to the  collective ﬁlm 11’09’’01 - September 11 (2002), both featuring witnesses of 
the coup and the Pinochet regime, ﬁlms strongly mobilized by the requirement 
to remember the past despite the melancholia it might (and does) entail when 
memory disengages with the present—the present is visually brought in, to be 
confronted with a past that remains fragmented and isolated from the present. 
What matters here is the ﬁssure between past and present, not mainly the dis-
closing of but the spectator’s perceptual experience of that ﬁssure. The ﬁssure 
prevents memory from settling in, more or less comfortably, in the past.
Indeed, on the one hand, the installation brings aurally to the surface a past 
which has already been lost, repressed, distorted, or forgotten, which remains 
unresolved collectively. This resurfacing cannot be equated to a recovering of 
the past as an absolute or to the re-establishment of the lost continuity between 
past and present: the two temporalities are displayed through fractionalized 
 documents and their respective realities scarcely match. The suspension of 
 history lies  precisely in this disclosure of a temporal coexistence which is also 
a  discontinuity, a ﬁssure similar to Doris Salcedo’s recent intervention—the 
 creation of a 167 meters-long crack in the cement floor of the Turbine Hall of the 
Tate Modern in London (Shibboleth, 2007)—which starts as a simple  fracture 
but ends up as a border that one may cross but which persists as a rupture, a 
negative space  evoking “the hole of History that marks the […] difference that 
 separates whites from non-whites,” a difference that is “bottomless, like the 
 division between people.”11 Time here refuses to pass and flow even if you jump 
over it as a game: both installations (Salcedo’s and Ohanian’s) equalize the past 
and the present as coexisting but un-passing temporalities. On the other hand, 
however, September 11, 1973_Santiago, Chile engages the spectator in a percep-
tual and cognitive split between irreconcilable images and sounds, an irreconcil-
ability that sets into play a necessary processing of heterogeneous realities. This 
processing, and this is my main claim, becomes the condition of possibility of 
a sense of futurity. In other words, the suspension of “the historical condition” 
(Paul Ricœur’s postulate that the three tenses of temporality, present, future, past, 
are inseparable) is not an end in itself. Rather, it is an aesthetic strategy insepar-
able from a regeneration of  historical time, the spectator’s necessary engagement 
in the perceptual dissymmetry between sound and image. To understand this 
paradoxical  continuum, one must consider the three main contextual principles 
which sustain it: (1) a  historical principle, laid out by historian Reinhart Koselleck, 
11. Doris Salcedo, quoted in “Doris Salcedo à la Tate Modern (London 5),” Le 
Monde, October 25th, 2007, http//lucileee.blog.lemonde.fr/2007/10/25/doris-salcedo-a-la-
tate-modern-londres-5 (our translation).
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according to which historical time, since modernity, corresponds to an expanding 
asymmetry between past and future, between spaces of expectation and horizons 
of expectation; (2) a tenseless principle according to which the past, the present 
and the future are not tensely related but equally real; and (3) a narrative or 
representational principle following which there is no historical time without nar-
rativity and no narrativity without an observer, even in cases where narrativity is 
radically reinvented in its opposition to the modern concept of history as progress, 
project, telos. These three principles, I hope to show, are the means by which a 
transformed sense of historical time is elaborated through its very suspension.
the historical principle
Recent developments in historiography, especially in France in the work of Pierre 
Nora and Paul Ricœur, have lead to an important reassessment of the  discipline 
of history after its fundamental socio-economic reshaping by the school of the 
Annales between the 1930s and 1960s. Ohanian’s investigation of histo rical time 
is best understood in the context of this reassessment. Characteristic of this shift 
is the “return” of the event which had been signiﬁcantly devalued by  Fernand 
Braudel, one of the main protagonists of the Annales, in his focus on the quasi-
immobile history of longue durée in opposition to event history based on the 
valorization of short time. The shift also involves a renewed attention to oblivion, 
memory, testimony, and the central role of the witness in the making and writing 
of history. Time does not allow me here to draw a decent picture of these  complex 
developments but I do want to call attention to the historio graphical work of 
François Hartog which proceeds to historicize the memory-driven reorientation 
of the discipline of history. His Régimes d’historicité: présentisme et expériences du 
temps (2003) is a key study on how different historical periods elaborate  different 
orders of time and how “presentism” has become, especially since the 1980s, 
the prevailing regime of historicity of our epoch. Presentism is an order of time 
characterized not only by a removal into the present but an absorption of the 
past and the future in the present. In this prevalent regime, temporal passage 
dissolves, bringing us at the doorstep of what literary critic Fredric Jameson calls 
the end of temporality: “a dramatic and alarming shrinkage of existential time 
and the reduction to a present that hardly qualiﬁes as such any longer, given the 
virtual effacement of that past and future that can alone deﬁne a present in the 
ﬁrst place.”12 
12. Fredric Jameson, “The end of temporality,” Critical Inquiry, vol. 29, n° 4, Summer 
2003, p. 708.
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Hartog’s analysis is based on the observation of recent events—namely, the 
collapse of communism, the last major political utopia, materialized in the fall 
of the Berlin Wall in 1989; consumer society’s ever-increasing valorization of the 
ephemeral; the mass-media compression of time; tourism; the phenomenon of 
mass lay-outs and its insertion of the unemployed in a project-less temporality—
all of which have played a pivotal role in “the present’s progressive invasion of the 
horizon,” a present which is “increasingly inflated, hypertrophied.”13 His assess-
ment is also based on the observation of the now vast western preoccupation for 
conservation and the related revalorization of memory, genealogy,  patrimony, 
and commemoration, made evident in France by Nora’s seminal 1984 Lieux de 
la mémoire, practices that not only marginalize the notion of the future but also 
document the past in light of the present. But it is  likewise  considerably indebted 
to Reinhart Koselleck’s understanding of modern historical time as the distance 
that increasingly separates the space of experience and the  horizon of expecta-
tion. For Koselleck, modernity is a moment of rupture, whose emphasis on 
progress breaks with the pre-seventeenth-century peasant-artisan world based on 
the continuity of the past and the future, in which expectation “subsisted entirely 
on the experience of their predecessors, experiences which in turn became those 
of their successors.”14 Endowed with promises of progress, change, perfectibil-
ity, novelty, fulﬁlment, and opportunity, all of which were supported by techno- 
industrial and scientiﬁc invention, modernity articulates an increasing asym-
metry between memory and hope, between experience (the present past, whose 
past events “have been incorporated and can be remembered” in the present) and 
expectation (the future made present, which “directs itself to the not-yet, to the 
nonexperienced, to that which is to be revealed”).15 Meanwhile, the accele rating 
pace of the modern world shaped by developments in communications and rates 
of production left human agents with briefer time spans to experience the present 
“as the present,” an increased brevity by which the self-accelerating  temporality 
“escapes into a future” while placing heavier and heavier demands on that future.16 
13. François Hartog, Régimes d’historicité: présentisme et expériences du temps,  Paris, 
Éditions du Seuil, coll.“Librairie du xxie siècle,” 2003, p. 12, 125 and 126 (our translation).
14. Reinhart Koselleck, “Space of Experience and Horizon of Expectation: Two His-
torical Categories,” in Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time, trans. Keith 
Tribe, New York, Columbia University Press, 2004, p. 264-265.
15. Reinhart Koselleck, “Space of Experience and Horizon of Expectation: Two His-
torical Categories,” in Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time, p. 259.
16. Reinhart Koselleck, “Modernity and the Planes of Historicity,” in Futures Past: On 
the Semantics of Historical Time, p. 22.
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Hartog argues that modernity’s asymmetrical relationship between the space 
of experience and the horizon of expectation has now reached a moment of 
quasi-rupture in which “the engendering of historical time seems suspended.”17 
The present resurfaces after its modern devalorization but only as a “worried” 
present, anxious about the catastrophes of that past that it seeks to overcome, and 
the anticipated catastrophes of the future that it seeks to avoid; about a future 
which ceases to be a promise or a principle of faith to become a threat for which 
we are all fully responsible.18 “This future, he writes, is not anymore the luminous 
horizon towards which we walk, but a shadow line that we have activated towards 
ourselves, while we seem to mark time in the zone of the present and ruminate 
a past which does not pass.”19 Today’s increased consideration of the irreparable 
and the irreversible; the insistence on attitudes of precaution and responsibility; 
the reiterated recourse to notions of patrimony, memory, and debt: all of these 
disquiet practices partakes of a present that has extended both into the past and 
the future.
The distance between Chile’s past and present elaborated in September 11, 
1973_Santiago, Chile, afﬁrms Hartog’s diagnosis of presentism and the related 
requisite to address the contemporary fate of the asymmetry between spaces of 
experience and horizons of expectation, in which the past and the future dis-
appear under the umbrella of the present. Indeed, the installation’s sound-image 
simultaneity discloses the rupture between the two temporalities within the now 
of the spectator’s attention. Even the spaces don’t seem to relate. Yet, the present-
ist sense of preservation of the past for the sake of the present, the sense of the 
past as a piling up of catastrophes, and the sense of the future as an apprehended 
catastrophe: this triad is signiﬁcantly absent from Ohanian’s address. After all, 
an archive—even in its fragmented state—is brought back and confronted with 
the present, an operation that exposes a conviction: the necessity to consider 
these dissimilar temporalities together despite or because of the distance that 
separates them. And the sense of the catastrophic appears nowhere in the instal-
lation. Presentism, the suspension of time and history, might well be the regime 
of historicity that informs September 11, 1973_Santiago, Chile, it is not what the 
work reinforces. On the contrary, Ohanian’s suspension of time should be under-
stood as expressing a continuum between presentism and a disintegration of 
17. François Hartog, Régimes d’historicité: présentisme et expériences du temps, p. 28. 
18. François Hartog, Régimes d’historicité: présentisme et expériences du temps, p. 132.
19. François Hartog, Régimes d’historicité: présentisme et expériences du temps, 
p. 206.
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 presentism, an aesthetics that turns the presentist suspension of history to which 
it belongs into a suspension of time that might, under speciﬁc conditions, open 
up the process of history. 
In the area of aesthetics, Jacques Rancière has already identiﬁed—and here 
he implicitly supports Hartog’s diagnosis—how recent art contributes to the 
 generalized catastrophist relation to the future, a perspective that puts an end to 
the aesthetic undertaking of emancipation inherited from the historical avant-
garde. Jean-François Lyotard’s defence of the sublime is a key manifestation of 
this shift, in which art must continually grieve the lie underlying its promise of 
emancipation and activate “inﬁnite justice” for “inﬁnite evil.”20 Paradoxically, 
as Rancière argues, this presentism is sustained by a theology of time, “the idea 
of modernity as a time dedicated to the accomplishment of an internal neces-
sity, yesterday glorious and today disastrous.”21 The present requirement, then, 
if one is to give back to art and politics their ability to make a difference, is to 
refuse the phantasm of their purity and to reconﬁrm “their quality as cuts, which 
are always ambiguous, precarious, and litigious.”22 This conception entails the 
abandonment of pivotal concepts of modern history, including the theology of 
time,  original trauma and anticipated salvation or damnation. I am suggesting 
here that September 11, 1973_Santiago, Chile is an actualization of this require-
ment. In anticipation of what I will be arguing further down, the originality of 
this installation lies in its attempt to dig out, through its simultaneous structure, 
the possibility of a future liberated both from the modern telos scheme and the 
presentist presumption of catastrophe. 
the tenseless principle 
To actualize this condition, the installation elaborates, as is the case with Seven 
Minutes Before and Hidden which both centre on a single moment in time, 
what must be called a tenseless view of time, one that substantially challenges 
both the representation of the passage of time and the representation of time as 
a dimension of change. As Yuval Dolev has persuasively observed, one of the 
major philosophical debates informing the conception of time today concerns 
the dispute between the tensed perspective which “defends the reality of time’s 
passage within a framework in which the present is conceived as ‘ontologically 
20. Jacques Rancière, Malaise dans l’esthétique, Paris, Éditions Galilée, coll. “La phi-
losophie en effet”, 2004, p. 170-171 (our translation).
21. Jacques Rancière, Malaise dans l’esthétique, p. 172 (our translation).
22. Jacques Rancière, Malaise dans l’esthétique, p. 173 (our translation).
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privileged’ with respect to the past and the future” and the tenseless analytical 
perspective which “denies the reality of the distinction between the past, present 
and future and so of time’s passage.” 23 The tenseless view—a view I believe to 
be fundamental to Ohanian’s reiterated exploration of simultaneity—holds that 
all events, be them past, present or future, are equally real, that they are on an 
“ontological par.” It is based on the understanding that the relationship between 
the past, present and future is governed not by tensed relations but by relations of 
precedence, succession, and simultaneity. The tenseless view supports one of the 
important ﬁndings of Einstein’s Special Relativity: the fact that time is a physical 
thing, a malleable, flexible and mutable matter. In the words of physicist Paul 
Davies: “The major upshot of [Einstein’s] new theory of relativity […] was the 
prediction that time and space are not, as Newton had proclaimed, simply there, 
ﬁxed once and for all in an absolute and universal way for all observers to share. 
Instead, they are in some sense malleable, able to stretch and shrink according to 
the observer’s motion.”24 By aesthetically privileging the tenseless simultaneity of 
the past and the present, September 11, 1973_Santiago, Chile is not representing 
how the past has marked the present or how the present will be transformed in 
the future (how, in short, these temporalities tensely interact) but displays the 
past and the present as simultaneous. This tenseless reality is not just a matter of 
philosophical debate but more decisively a historical observation. If Koselleck and 
Hartog are right, the modern distance between the past and the future, between 
the space of experience and the horizon of expectation, has reached a moment 
of near rupture: this growing distance entails a decrease of tensed relations and a 
corresponding increase in tenselessness. 
If there is, as philosopher of science Hilary Putnam has postulated in his 
assessment of Einstein’s Theory of Special Relativity, no privileged foliation of 
spacetime—if, therefore “all inertial frames of reference are metaphysically on 
par with each other”—then we have to accept that “the contents of all regions 
of space-time” are “equally real.”25 In other words, my state of motion does not 
have greater authority than yours “when it comes to deﬁning what is, and what 
is not, real from the perspective of our shared here-now.”26 By aesthetically 
23. Yuval Dolev, Time and Realism: Metaphysical and Antimetaphysical Perspectives, 
p. viii.
24. Paul Davies, About Time: Einstein’s Unfinished Revolution, New York, Simon & 
Schuster Paperbacks, 1995, p. 53.
25. Michael Lockwood, The Labyrinth of Time: Introducing the Universe, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 57.
26. Michael Lockwood, The Labyrinth of Time: Introducing the Universe, p. 57.
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deploying a heterochronic view of space in a single moment, lateralizing as it 
does the  different histories of each temporal layers of a singular landscape, Seven 
Minutes Before materializes this parity. Likewise, by aesthetically deploying the 
simulta neity of the past and the present, September 11, 1973_Santiago, Chile is 
not representing how the past has marked the present or how the present will be 
transformed in the future (how, in short, these temporalities tensely interact) but 
operates a past-present equalization, which is necessarily relativistic. 
Dolev is accurate in pointing out how both the tensed and tenseless 
 conceptions of time depend on a problematic ontological claim about real time 
(both camps rely on the following de-contextualized metaphysical assumption: 
“the idea that there is an ontology here waiting to be fleshed out”), but he also 
emphasizes that the tenseless view does not challenge the persistence of our 
tensed experiences—the fact, for example, that we change and grow older as time 
passes, or that we remember the past and anticipate the future. The tenseless 
camp argues more precisely that the past, present and future are experienced, 
spoken of and thought of as distinct and passing, but that this passing does not 
concern “the things we experience, think, and speak about.”27 September 11, 
1973_Santiago, Chile aesthetically maintains this nuance as a strategy of histor-
ical consciousness, for the tenseless rendering of time that refuses to pass and 
flow, i.e. time’s suspension, progressively makes possible a post-tensed view which 
admits a renewed passage of time. Why? Because the suspension of time, here, 
engages the spectators in the duration of perception and compels them to pro-
cess the temporal  asymmetries. The installation introduces an archive, Patricio 
 Guzmán’s The Coup d’Etat, simultaneously with Ohanian’s own video document 
of  Santiago, Chile today. It does so following a procedure akin to Doris Salcedo’s 
Shibboleth but also to the main aesthetic tradition the Tate Modern installation 
is indebted to: Gordon Matta-Clark’s house cuts, emblematically operated in his 
1974 Splitting project. This procedure entails the splitting of a document (a house 
for Matta-Clark, a museum floor for Salcedo, a ﬁlm for Ohanian) that exposes 
what exists beyond the document and now entering the document: an outside, a 
spectator, a community, a city, a planet, other images, other temporalities. The 
soundtrack of The Coup d’Etat is released as it were to let another fractionalized 
document (Santiago, 2007) interact with it. In short, the simultaneity of sounds 
about the past and images about the present doesn’t simply disclose today’s gap 
between temporal categories but invites the spectator to experiment these sound-
27. Yuval Dolev, Time and Realism: Metaphysical and Antimetaphysical Perspectives, 
p. 6 (emphasis added).
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image oscillations, to perceptually struggle with the oscillating discrepancies so 
that he or she might establish innovative temporal relations.
the narrative principle
This is where narrativity comes in, via dissymmetry, for it is the spectator who 
must negotiate the gaps between sound and image, the past and the present; as it 
is the spectator who negotiates, in Hidden, the non-perceivable distance between 
the images of gallery one and gallery two; in Seven Minutes Before, the distance 
between frame-block 1, frame-block 2, and frame-block 3; and in September 11, 
1973_Santiago, Chile, the distance between sound and image. This is not merely 
an intellectual engagement but ﬁrst and foremost a perceptual one. What is the 
spectator perceptually negotiating in Ohanian’s works if not the heterochrony of a 
speciﬁc in time or of a speciﬁc space in time? This negotiation is invisible in the 
installations and never represented by Ohanian. Without the spectator’s phenom-
enal engagement in such negotiations, there is no representation of  historical 
time, no passage of time, no human time. The burden, the responsibility, is on 
her. In contrast to Guzmán’s Chile, la Memoria Obstinada and Ken Loach’s con-
tribution to 11’09’’01 - September 11 (2002), witnessing is not what a spectator looks 
at or listens to but what the spectator sets into play herself within the confronta-
tion of temporally un-flowing pasts and presents. His works engage the spectator 
in what cognitive psychology calls the “binding problem”—the association of 
different features of an object so that it may be perceived as a single object or the 
association of objects so that they may be perceived as connected—which arises 
mainly because the brain’s processing of information is carried out through sev-
eral systems analyzing more or less separately the different features of the object. 
The whole point of Seven Minutes Before, as well as Hidden and September 11, 
1973_Santiago, Chile, is that they discourage binding while making use of the 
exhibition space as “glue.”28 The spectator keeps struggling (a struggle that con-
ﬁrms Bergson’s view that perception is about duration) within this binding effort 
required for the establishment of the historical condition. 
It is the active fractionalization of two archives presented simultaneously 
and the perceptual crisis activated by such a fractionalization in the viewer 
28. Edward E. Smith and Stephen M. Kosslyn, Cognitive Psychology: Mind and 
Brain, Upper Saddle River, New Jersey, Pearson Prentice Hall, 2007, p. 69. Smith and 
Kosslyn, two cognitive psychologists, use the term glue in their discussion of the  binding 
problem—space can function as a glue mechanism that resolves perceptual binding 
 difﬁculties.
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that make Ohanian’s work a unique player in what art historian Hal Foster has 
labelled “the archival impulse” of contemporary art, an impulse Foster  uncovers 
in works which, as is the case with September 11, 1973_Santiago, Chile “make 
 historical  information, often lost or displaced, physically present” through the 
fragmentary use of archives. Foster’s insightful uncovering falls short, how-
ever, of addressing what happens to concepts and practices of time, history 
and  perception in this very process.29 The perceptual experience sustained by 
September 11, 1973_Santiago, Chile is certainly more complex than a mere mis-
match. The spectator here is interpellated in his or her contemporaneity both 
as a media multitasker—a performer of simultaneous media tasks shaped by 
the imperative of time management—and as a viewer perceptually trained by 
image-sound ﬁlm synchronization, by what musician and video artist Chris 
Marclay has called the subliminal dimension of sound in cinema—the fact 
that sound  conditions the visual experience of the image by directing the emo-
tions of the viewer in ways that reinforce the representational order of illusion. 
Sound is more powerful than the image and makes the image adhere to it.30 
Ohanian is absolutely aware of the insepa rability of temporal and perceptual 
critique. He solicits us as multitaskers (in our  supposed ability to listen and 
look at two different media stimuli at the same time) but makes us fail in that 
task: multitasking becomes what most psychologists now call task switching, a 
switching that delays image-sound adherence. 
The de-synchronization and re-synchronization of image and sound also 
work to weaken the image-sound adherence. However, it cannot completely 
erase it. The subliminal authority of sound, the ways in which it orients the 
perception and meaning of the image or the ways in which—once divided from 
the image—it outweighs the image, never simply disappears. This is even more 
so the case here, where the sound has the aura of the past, the mystery of the 
invisible and the quality of a failed revolution, and where, comparatively, the 
images relate to commonplace, apparently impoverished, contemporary life. 
As one experiences the work, the sound-image inconsistency is thus not always 
palpable, varying in intensity from one moment to the next, oscillating between 
simultaneity and non-simultaneity. When the doubleness of the two sources is 
identiﬁed, it becomes extremely difﬁcult—in fact impossible—to fully grasp 
together the sound and the image, the past and the present. But the persistence 
29. Hal Foster, “An Archival Impulse,” October, n° 110, Fall 2004, p. 4.
30. Christian Marclay, “Conversation entre Michael Snow et Christian Marclay,” in 
Replay Marclay, Exposition Musée de la musique 9 mars-24 juin 2007, Paris, Musée de la 
musique, Réunion des musées nationaux, 2007, p. 131 (our translation).
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of our perceptual training also means that our ﬁrst reflex is to overcome this 
cleavage. Most of the time, one is torn—for the sake of intelligibility—between 
abandoning the image for the sake of the sound or the sound for the survival 
of the image. It is only when the video proposes motionless representations, 
namely images of monuments (statues, the palace, tombs, famous buildings, 
the stadium), that the visual and the aural can more intelligibly coexist for 
the spectator. 
Let us insist, however, on this point: despite our perceptual efforts, this 
coexistence never leads to a present-past reconciliation. Rather, the images of 
Santiago today appear (on the surface at least) oblivious to the past. When the 
camera catches persisting symbols of communism, for example, they emerge as 
obsolete relics in contrast to the communist and socialist discourses of 1973; and 
when the soundtrack transmits ideological debates of 1973, the video camera 
catches a 2007 view of an empty television studio whose multicolour flashing 
light projections propel us in the world of the spectacle. In short, the perceptual 
experience of image-sound simultaneity is a split one, while our highly trained 
ﬁlmic habits and multitask desires keep ﬁghting to deny the split. As such, 
 September 11, 1973_Santiago, Chile’s simultaneity is a temporal and perceptual 
procedure which may well refer to History but refutes the passage that constitutes 
it since modernity, what Dolev names “the becoming present of future events 
and then their becoming past.”
Most notably in September 11, 1973_Santiago, Chile then, today’s regime of 
time mana gement as best manifested in multitasking (today’s normalized per-
ceptual simulta neity par excellence) becomes what high technology consultant 
Linda Stone has called “continuous partial attention,” or the unsustainability 
of full continuous attention to different media stimuli. In this, the installation 
explores the  ﬁndings on multitasking of contemporary psychology and neuro-
science. Indeed, as  cognitive psychologists Michael Eysenck and Mark Keane 
have recently  concluded:
(a)lthough some studies seem to suggest that two complex tasks can be performed 
together without disruption, closer readings of the studies do not necessarily prove 
that. There are often signs of interference. […] Two tasks are performed well to-
gether when they are dissimilar, when they are relatively easy, and when they are well 
 practiced. In contrast, the worst levels of performance occur when two tasks are 
highly similar, rather difﬁcult, and have been practiced very little.31 
31. Michael W. Eysenk and Mark T. Keane, “Attention and Performance Limita-
tions,” in Daniel J. Levitin (ed.), Foundations of Cognitive Psychology: Core Readings, 
Cambridge, MIT Press, 2002, p. 380 and p. 395.
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One key study, directed by psychologist Hal Pashler, is particularly relevant 
to the question of the suspension of time in its assessment of the durational 
 temporality of multitasking. Testing the brain’s ability to respond to two diffe-
rent sounds in quick succession, Pashler “found that the brain stalls fractionally 
before responding to the second stimulus”; while the second sound is perceived, 
the brain requires time, if only milliseconds, to systematize a response. Unlike 
the computer, the human brain isn’t structured as a parallel but a serial processor. 
Multitasking is deﬁned here as task switching and the brain becomes “more of a 
time-share operation” than a means of “concurrent processing.”32 This is exactly 
how Ohanian’s installation interpellates the spectator, how his installations (and I 
borrow here from Foster’s discussion of the archival impulse) “call out for human 
interpretation.”33 The suspension of time produced by multitasking as an opti-
mum of time management disintegrates as it introduces gaps, distances, hiccups 
between coexisting events or coexisting times. 
In his study of the historical narrative, Paul Ricœur enounces a postulate 
which relates directly to this state of affairs. “Time becomes human time, he 
writes, inasmuch as it is narratively articulated.”34 It is through the narrative that 
history keeps a link with our basic competence to follow a story, as well as with 
the cognitive operations of narrative comprehension by which history “obliquely” 
continues to relate to the ﬁeld of human action and its basic temporality.35 The 
absence, in September 11, 1973_Santiago, Chile, of any resolved form of represen-
tation of the past, present or future, of history tout court, means that it is up to 
the spectator, through his or her multitasking and ﬁlm response training, to take 
up a narrative with the fragments of the coexisting documents, a narrative by 
which one can think “the mortal time of phenomenology and the public time 
of narrative sciences” together.36 In this, the spectator adopts the function of 
the witness, a function that takes a crucial role in Ricœur’s important supple-
ment to his study on the historical narrative—Memory, History, Forgetting (2000; 
32. Hal Pashler, “Dual-Task Interference and Cognitive Architecture,” colloquium 
paper, University of California, San Diego, September 23, 2004; and http://dual.task.org/
images/08MULTITASK.html. 
33. Hal Foster, “An Archival Impulse”, p. 5.
34. Paul Ricœur, Temps et récit 1. L’intrigue et le récit historique, Paris, Éditions 
du Seuil, coll. “Points. Essais”, 1983, p. 17 (our translation). 
35. Paul Ricœur, Temps et récit 1. L’intrigue et le récit historique, p. 167 (our 
translation).
36. Paul Ricœur, Temps et récit 1. L’intrigue et le récit historique, p. 161 (our 
 translation).
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2004)— written “because he had, as it were, forgotten forgetting.”37 According 
to Ricœur, the  witness’s testimony is the foundation of history, one that sustains 
the whole  process of making history. For, within the historical sphere, testimony 
doesn’t end with the constitution of archives but resurfaces at the level of the rep-
resentation of the past through the written or visual narrative.38 In September 11, 
1973_Santiago, Chile, testimony lies, fractionalized, in Guzmán’s document, in 
the testimonies of the witnesses he interviews (of which we only hear the voices), 
in  Ohanian’s own visual document of present Santiago, in his creation of an 
installation. The sound and image splitting of the documents is operated to priv-
ilege another  witness who can engage narratively with the work: the spectator. 
It is there that a post-tenseless representation of historical time, a post-tenseless 
aesthetics of the passage of time, can come about, if it is to come about. 
These mental processes interconnect practices of dissonances, gaps, hetero-
chronies, representation, and interpretation, all of which have to do with return, 
a not-so-smooth return. Not only the return of the past—with the understanding 
that the past never fully returns—but, more fundamentally, the display of the path 
by which oblivion relates to remembrance, memory and collective history: devoid 
of any physical or mnemonic traces of its reality, the past ceases to exist; but it is 
this fragility of the archive (the fact that it can disappear or simply be ignored) 
that motivates the necessity to recall these traces. “Forgetting, writes Ricœur, 
is the emblem of the vulnerability of the historical condition in its entirety.”39 
It is so, as Hayden White’s account of Ricœur’s Memory, History, Forgetting 
points out, because history (as a modern practice) has usually been written “to 
cover over or hide or deflect attention from ‘what really happened’ in the past by 
 creating an ‘ofﬁcial version’ that substitutes a part of the past for the whole,” and 
because of the numerous political programs of modernity “designed, as it seems, 
to abject that very humanity that the rest of ‘history’ seemed to have been striving 
to create.”40 The spectator’s perceptual confrontation of two cut documents 
that fail to cohere but launch their openness one vis-à-vis the other initiates a 
 narrativity which is precisely this act by which a spectator is required to insert 
forgetting or oblivion (the “_” of the title) in his or her récit historique. The histo-
37. Hayden White, “Guilty of History? The Longue Durée of Paul Ricoeur,” History 
and Theory, vol. 46, n° 2, May 2007, p. 233.
38. Paul Ricœur, La mémoire, l’histoire, l’oubli, Paris, Éditions du Seuil, coll. “Points. 
Essais”, 2000, p. 181-182. 
39. Paul Ricœur, La mémoire, l’histoire, l’oubli, p. 374.
40. Hayden White, “Guilty of History? The Longue Durée of Paul Ricoeur,” p. 237-
238.
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rical narrative is not an answer to oblivion—the possibility to represent the whole 
of history once all oblivions have been recovered, the possibility to unify past and 
present—but the acknowledgement of oblivion in the historical condition. It is 
this very integration that offers the possibility of a renewed connection between 
past and present, an inventive redeployment of the passage of time within the 
equally real, equally valid spaces of Hidden, between the frames of Seven Min-
utes Before and between the two documents of September 11, 1973_Santiago, 
Chile, a conception that entails the abandonment of pivotal concepts of modern 
history, including time theology, original trauma, anticipated salvation, utopia, 
and damnation. As the spectator engages in the post-tenseless deployment of 
“the becoming present of future events and then their becoming past,” he or 
she is actually engaged in a replay of a mediated past where past and present 
are brought together with the gaps of oblivion. The installation’s elaboration of 
a space of oblivion provides a crucial interval for the re-interpretation of history 
from the part of the spectator. The possibility of re-interpretation is what con-
veys a sense of futurity to the  historical discourse. The outcome of this future—
change or status quo?—remains of course unknown but the re-interpretation of 
the Chilean archives it presupposes does bring in a key element in our reception 
of the work: the notion of democracy. The suspension of the passage of time is 
after all an aesthetic materialization of the 1973 coup’s suspension of democracy, 
which did in many ways suspend the passage of democratic time.
In the aftermath of the military coup of 1973, many European countries, 
namely France, Germany, Italy and Sweden where politicians followed closely 
Allende’s attempt to create socialist reforms democratically, were struck by the 
following: the Chilean military, with initial support from the US government, 
brought down the democratically elected socialist Unidad Popular government 
and initiated a seventeen-year dictatorship led by General Augusto Pinochet using 
repression against the regime dissidents (a repression assumed to be responsible 
for the death of over 3000 people and the imprisonment of over 100 000 people). 
The simultaneous replay of two cut documents related to the past and the present 
of Santiago, the tenseless rendering of these two temporalities, reopens this reflec-
tion on democracy in light of the present, while forcing us to reassess the utopia 
attached to the ﬁnal quote of Guzmán’s document: “ History is ours, it is the work 
of the people.” What remains of Allende’s Unidad  Popular’s  democratic attempts? 
Was democracy in Chile ever achieved? And, beyond Chile, what constitutes 
a democracy? In his study on Chilean democracy, histo rian José Del Pozo has 
maintained that the very possibility of the military coup in 1973 made manifest 
how, despite democratic elections, the military received the support of many 
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groups of Chilean society (entrepreneurs, the political right, judges, high func-
tionaries, and sections of the Christian Democratic Party) who did not hesitate 
to re-enact repressive forces of the past after realizing that they had lost control 
over the country.41 It is also clear that the economic crisis which emerged under 
the Allende government in 1972—a crisis which led to major strikes in the work 
force—together with Allende’s governance by decree  threatened the democratic 
institutions from within. Even today, research by socio logist Manuel A. Garretón 
concludes that, despite the democratic election of the  socialist  Concertación 
candidate Michelle Bachelet in 2005, democracy is “incomplete and qualita-
tively poor”: although there has been signiﬁcant progress in matters of human 
rights and political constitution reform, the Concertación still needs to transform 
the authoritarian institutions inherited from Pinochet—a reform that stagnates 
because of the government’s decision to privilege political stability and economic 
growth.42 
Such has been the productivity of the combined suspension of time and 
perception: the spectator’s engagement in the thinking and re-interpretation of 
the historical condition, a reactivation of the passage of time but outside teleology 
and within the remembering of forgetting in the récit historique, a questioning of 
the persistence or the waning, value or disvalue of democracy and utopia. Sep-
tember 11, 1973_Santiago, Chile, I have been arguing, is a key contri butor to the 
aesthetic exploration of the conditions of possibility of historical time: although it 
moves away—without any concession—from the explanation and representation 
of history, although it refuses to fully recover the past event or to indicate where 
its history is leading us, it insists on the requirement not to abandon the event, as 
well as the need to confront the never fully recovered past and present. It does so 
by creating for the spectator the perceptual conditions of possibility of historical 
narrativity, which takes the form here of mental processes that remain impalp-
able to others. The récit historique is the responsibility of each observer and, as 
such, is never made public or manifest by the artwork. Moreover, it is elaborated 
by spectators as their perceptual experience of suspended time is split between 
the simultaneity of an aural past and a visual present—an experience that keeps 
intensifying the now of a disjointed perception. The installation, in short, is more 
41. José Del Pozo, Le Chili contemporain: quelle démocratie ?, Montréal, Nota Bene, 
coll. “Essais critiques”, 2000.
42. Manuel Antonio Garretón, Incomplete Democracy: Political Democratization in 
Chile and Latin America, trans. R. Kelly Washbourne with Gregory Horvath, Chapel 
Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 2006.
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about the conditions of possibility of futurity than its noticeable actualization. 
By setting into play perceptual discrepancies for the spectator, it is an enabler 
rather than a direct producer of historical time, one that is inseparable from the 
simultaneous unfolding of different categories of time.
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